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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the doctrine of res judicata barred the trial 
court from clarifying the nature of Mr. Busch's Utah state 
law obligation to pay the parties' second mortgage in light 
of the Bankruptcy Court's prior ruling with respect to the 
nature of that obligation for purposes of federal bankruptcy 
law. A trial court's determination of whether res judicata 
bars consideration of an issue presents a question of law 
reviewable for correctness. See Maoris <£ Associates v. 
Neways, 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214. This issue was preserved 
in Mr. Busch's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation. 
(R. 525-526) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC. 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative or of central importance to 
this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from final orders of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County denying Mr. 
Busch's Motion for Order Clarifying Nature of Obligation and 
overruling Mr. Busch's Objection to Commissioner's 
Recommendation. 
II. Statement of Facts 
1. The trial of this action was held in December of 
1999. (R. 133) 
2. At trial, petitioner requested, inter alia, that 
respondent be ordered to pay the parties' second mortgage 
obligation as additional alimony. (R. 722 at p. 59, lines 5-
7) 
3. The Decree of Divorce was entered January 14, 2000. 
Therein, respondent was ordered: 
a. "to pay child support in the sum of $524.66 per 
month pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support 
Guidelines." 
b. "to pay the Petitioner $1,100 per month alimony for 
a term equal to the length of the marriage, which is 
thirteen (13) years and eleven (11) months from the 
date of entry of this Decree." 
c. "Respondent will assume and pay and hold Petitioner 
harmless from ... the second mortgage on the parties' 
home." 
(R. 141-145, paragraphs 4, 10 & 11) 
4. There was no evidence presented nor any argument 
made at 
trial, nor was there any finding of fact made by the trial 
court, 
from which it would have been appropriate to order Mr. Busch 
to 
pay the second mortgage as his share of the marital debt. 
5. Petitioner Cindy Busch (hereinafter referred to by 
her new married name "Hancock") remarried in or around 
September 2000. (R. 466) Accordingly, respondent's alimony 
obligation terminated at that time in accordance with Utah 
Code Ann. section 30-3-5(8). 
6. Respondent filed a Voluntary Petition for relief 
under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah on July 28, 2000. 
Ms. Hancock filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy court 
in which, among other things, she claimed priority status 
for Mr. Busch's obligation to pay the parties' second 
mortgage. (R. 721 at page 13) 
7. Mr. Busch objected to Ms. Hancock's proof of claim. 
Following hearings held March 13, 2001 and June 7, 2001, 
however, the bankruptcy court issued an oral ruling that, 
for purposes of federal bankruptcy law, Mr. Busch's 
obligation to pay the parties' second mortgage is entitled 
to priority treatment as a debt in the nature of child 
support, but only until August 26, 2004, the parties' minor 
child's eighteenth birthday. (R. 721, Tab 1 at page 4, lines 
7-9) 
8. The parties' second mortgage is amortized over 30 
years with a balloon payment due January 1, 2013. (R. 721, 
Tab 1 at page 2, lines 1-2) 
9. On or about March 22, 2001, Mr. Busch filed a 
Motion for Order Clarifying Nature of Obligation in the case 
at bar in which he requested, inter alia, that the trial 
court clarify that for purposes of Utah state law his 
obligation to pay the second mortgage was in the nature of 
alimony which terminated upon Ms. Hancock's remarriage. (R. 
465-467) 
10. A hearing on Mr. Busch's motion was held before 
the Honorable Michael S. Evans on April 24, 2001. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, Commissioner Evans recommended 
that Mr. Busch's motion be denied because x'[i]n view of [the 
bankruptcy court's] ruling it is the opinion of this Court 
that the issue now sought to be brought before this Court in 
Defendant's [sic] Motion is, in fact, Res Judicata because 
of Judge Clark's [i.e., the bankruptcy judge's] ruling on 
the same issue." (R. 567-568) 
11. Mr. Busch filed his Objection to Commissioner's 
Recommendation on May 2, 2001. (R. 525-526) 
12. Following a hearing before the Honorable Bruce 
Lubeck on August 14, 2001, the trial court issued its Order 
on Defendant's [sic] Objection to Commissioner's 
Recommendation in which it overruled Mr. Busch's objection 
to Commissioner Evans' recommendation. (R. 690-691) 
13. Mr. Busch timely filed his Notice of Appeal on 
September 26, 2001. (R. 692) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In order for the issue preclusion branch of res 
judicata to have barred consideration of Mr. Busch's Motion 
for Order Clarifying Nature of Obligation the trial court 
was first required to "determine whether the issues actually 
litigated in the [bankruptcy court were] precisely the same 
as those raised in the present action." Schaer v. State By 
& Through Utah Dept., 657 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Utah 
1983)(quoting Wilde v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 635 P.2d 
417, 419 (Utah 1981))(emphasis original). Mr. Busch 
respectfully submits that the issue decided by the 
bankruptcy court was substantially different from the one 
which he asked the trial court to decide in the case at bar. 
The issue before the bankruptcy court was whether Mr. 
Busch's obligation to pay the parties' second mortgage was 
entitled to priority treatment as a debt in the nature of 
child support within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(7) 
and 1322(a) (2) . For purposes of sections 507(a) (7) and 
1322(a)(2), the determination of whether an obligation 
arising under a Decree of Divorce is in the nature child 
support is a question of federal bankruptcy law regardless 
of the nature of that obligation under state law. E.g., In 
re Sampson, 997 F.2d 717, 722 (10th Cir. 1993). 
The issue which Mr. Busch asked the trial court to 
decide in the case at bar, on the other hand, is whether his 
obligation to pay the second mortgage was intended to be in 
lieu of additional alimony which terminated upon Ms. 
Hancock's remarriage in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
section 30-3-5 (8) . 
Because the two issues are not "precisely the same," 
the issue preclusion branch of res judicata is not 
applicable. Schaer, 657 P.2d at 1341. 
ARGUMENT 
The issue decided by the bankruptcy court is not the 
same issue which Mr. Busch asked the trial court to 
decide in the case at bar. 
There are two branches to the doctrine of res judicata: 
claim preclusion and issue preclusion. E. g., Macris & 
Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 119, 16 P.3d 
1214, 1219. 
The basic difference between the two branches of res 
judicata is simply put: while "claim preclusion applies 
to whole claims'' . . . issue preclusion, or collateral 
estoppel, arises from a different cause of action and 
prevents parties ... from relitigating "particular 
issues that have been contested and resolved/' 
Id. at 134 (quoting 18 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal 
Practice § 131.13[1](Matthew Bender, 3d ed. 2000))(Supreme 
Court's emphasis). Mr. Busch believes it is clear that the 
case at bar involves the issue preclusion branch of res 
judicata and will limit his arguments accordingly. 
In order for issue preclusion to have barred 
consideration of Mr. Busch's Motion for Order Clarifying 
Nature of Obligation the trial court was first required to 
determine "whether the issues actually litigated in the 
[bankruptcy court were] precisely the same as those raised 
in the instant action."1 Swainston v. Intermountain Health 
Care, 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988)(quoting Wilde v. Mid-
Century Insurance Co., 635 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 
1981)) (emphasis original); see also Schaer v. State By & 
Through Utah Dept., 657 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Utah 1983). 
Mr. Busch respectfully submits that issue preclusion is 
not applicable in this case because the issue decided by the 
bankruptcy court was substantially different from the one 
which he asked the trial court to decide. The issue which 
Mr. Busch asked the trial court to decide is whether his 
obligation to pay the parties' second mortgage was intended 
to be in lieu of additional alimony which terminated upon 
Ms. Hancock's remarriage in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
section 30-3-5(8). That is, of course, a question of state 
law. The issue before the bankruptcy court, on the other 
xThe Supreme Court of Utah has established "a four-part 
test to determine whether the doctrine of issue preclusion 
is applicable: First, the issue challenged must be identical 
in the previous action and in the case at hand. Second, the 
issue must have been decided in a final judgment on the 
merits in the previous action. Third, the issue must have 
been competently, fully, and fairly litigated in the 
previous action. Fourth, the party against whom collateral 
estoppel is invoked in the current action must have been 
either a party or privy to a party in the previous action." 
Maoris, 2000 UT 93, 137, 16 P.3d at 1222. Only the first 
part of this test will be addressed by Mr. Busch. 
hand, was whether Mr. Busch's obligation to pay the second 
mortgage was entitled to priority treatment as a debt in the 
nature of child support within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. §§ 
507(a)(7) and 1322(a)(2). The determination of whether an 
obligation arising under a Decree of Divorce is in the 
nature of child support is a question of federal bankruptcy 
law regardless of the nature of that obligation under state 
law. In re Sampson, 997 F.2d 717, 722 (10th Cir. 1993); 
Matter of Biggs, 907 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1990); and Shaver v. 
Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1984).2 
2In Sampson, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
recognized that 
Congress, by directing federal courts to determine 
whether an obligation is "actually in the nature of 
alimony, maintenance, or support," sought to ensure 
that section 523(a) (5)'s underlying policy is not 
undermined either by the treatment of the obligation 
under state law or by the label which the parties 
attach to the obligation. Thus, a debtor's lack of 
duty under state law to support his or her former 
spouse does not control whether an obligation to the 
former spouse is dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
997 F.2d at 722 (emphasis added); see also Sylvester v. 
Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1989)("While it is 
true that the divorce decree refers to the settlement 
agreement as a ^property settlement,' that label does not 
resolve the issue. The determination of whether an 
obligation arising out of a divorce settlement is in the 
nature of alimony, maintenance, or support is a matter of 
federal bankruptcy law"); In re Goin, 808 F.2d 1391 (10th 
Cir. 1987)("bankruptcy courts are not bound by state laws 
At the April 24, 2001 hearing on Mr. Busch's Motion for 
Order Clarifying Nature of Obligation Ms, Hancock 
acknowledged that the issue decided by the bankruptcy court 
is different from the one which Mr. Busch asked the trial 
court to decide: 
THE COURT: ... how would you characterize [the nature 
of Mr. Busch's obligation to pay the second mortgage] 
then? 
Mr. TYCKSEN: Your Honor, I believe if I were to try to 
characterize it from what this court would normally do, 
I couldn't do it because the, to call it child support 
[as the bankruptcy court did] would not be truthful. 
It isn't child support. To call it alimony would not 
be truthful either as this court would normally do. 
But in the application of Federal Law and Bankruptcy 
Law in that court as it's been applied over there, 
there are cases that say that if it has the effect of 
providing support to the family, i.e., maintaining a 
household with a dependent child and those kinds of 
things which is what the court found over there, then 
it is, in fact, [in the nature of child support and] 
not dischargable. 
(R. 721 at page 5, line 21 thru page 6, line 8) 
that define an item as maintenance or property settlement, 
nor are they bound to accept a divorce decree's 
characterization of an award as maintenance or a property 
settlement"); In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 
1986) (same); and In re Dewey, 223 B.R. 559 (10th Cir. BAP 
1998)(same). 
The Swainston case3 is also instructive- At issue in 
that case was IHC's successive motions to disqualify the 
firm of Howard, Lewis & Peterson from representing 
plaintiffs in two cases against IHC. Similar to the case at 
bar, Swainston involved a federal court action, Bodily v. 
IHC, and two Utah state court actions, Wilson v. IHC and 
Swainston itself. Unlike the case at bar, the Swainstons 
were not parties to either Bodily or Wilson. The Howard 
firm represented the plaintiff in Bodily, but had 
represented IHC in Wilson. IHC contended that this 
simultaneous representation of adverse parties constituted a 
violation of Canon 5 of the Utah Code of Professional 
Responsibility. In Bodily, the federal court denied IHC's 
motion to disqualify on the merits. In Swainston, the 
Fourth District Court denied IHC's subsequent motion to 
disqualify ruling that "IHC was collaterally estopped from 
litigating its motion because a similar motion had 
previously been litigated in a case in federal court.'' 766 
P.2d at 1059. IHC appealed from the Fourth District's 
ruling arguing that "the state court was not bound by the 
3
 Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care, 766 P.2d 
1059, 1061 (Utah 1988). 
federal court's ruling on the disqualification motion 
because the federal court decision relied on federal, not 
state, law." 766 P.2d at 1060. The Supreme Court agreed 
and reversed, explaining as follows: 
We must determine ^whether the issues actually 
litigated in the first action are precisely the same as 
those raised in the instant action." [citations 
omitted] In Bodily, the relevant question was whether 
the outcome of the case would be affected by the Howard 
firm's involvement in Wilson. In the present action, 
the relevant question is whether the present action has 
been affected or prejudiced by the Howard Firm's 
involvement in Wilson. The questions are not 
necessarily identical. There may be facts in Wilson 
which were not relevant to Bodily but are important to 
the present action. The Bodily court's ruling on the 
disqualification motion decided that the relevant facts 
from Wilson did not affect the Bodily litigation 
significantly. However, the scope of the Bodily 
court's inquiry was not large enough to determine that 
the Howard firm's involvement in Wilson would not 
adversely impact other cases. The first part of our 
test for issue preclusion is thus not satisfied. 
Swainston, 766 P.2d at 1061 (emphasis original); see also 
West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berger, 531 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Wis. 
App. 1995)(collateral estoppel only applies where 
controlling facts and legal rules remain unchanged). 
Thus, in addition to differences between state and 
federal law, the Swainston Court recognized that differences 
in the relevant facts to be considered in the respective 
cases is an important consideration in determining whether 
issue preclusion is applicable. In the case at bar, it is 
very clear that there were facts which were not only 
relevant but determinative in the bankruptcy court but which 
would be unimportant to the trial court and visa versa. As 
Ms. Hancock acknowledges, the determinative fact in the 
bankruptcy court was that Mr. Busch's obligation to pay the 
second mortgage "has the effect of providing support to [Ms. 
Hancock's] family." (R. 721 at page 6, line 5) Clearly, 
that fact would have little, if any, relevance to the issue 
which Mr. Busch asked the trial court to address in the case 
at bar. All of Mr. Busch's monetary obligations under the 
Decree of Divorce have the effect of providing support to 
Mr. Hancock's family. That fact, however, will not be 
helpful in determining whether Mr. Busch's obligation to pay 
the second mortgage was intended by the trial court to be in 
lieu of additional alimony or was simply intended to be part 
of the parties' property settlement. Further, under Utah 
law child support is determined by the guidelines set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.14. Section 78-45-7.14 was not 
relevant in the bankruptcy court. 
That a different issue was decided by the bankruptcy 
court is also demonstrated by answering the question: why 
did res judicata not bar the bankruptcy court from 
considering the issues decided in the Decree of Divorce? 
The Decree of Divorce was entered long before the bankruptcy 
court's involvement. The answer, of course, is that the 
Decree of Divorce did not determine the nature of Mr. 
Busch's obligation to pay the second mortgage for purposes 
of federal bankruptcy law. It is just as clear that the 
bankruptcy court was not concerned with the determining the 
nature of that obligation for state law purposes. 
In short, the question which Mr. Busch asked the trial 
court to decide in the case at bar is not whether his 
obligation to pay the second mortgage was entitled to 
priority treatment under 11 U.S.C. section 1322(a)(2) or 
dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(5). Rather, 
the question which Mr. Busch asked the trial court to decide 
is whether his obligation to pay the second mortgage was 
intended as additional alimony which terminated upon Ms. 
Hancock's remarriage. Because the two issues are not 
"precisely the same," the issue preclusion branch of res 
judicata is not applicable. Schaer, 657 P.2d at 1341. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Busch respectfully requests 
that the trial court's Orders denying his Motion for Order 
Clarifying Nature of Obligation and his Objection to 
Commissioner's Recommendation be reversed and that this case 
be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this Court's decision. 
DATED this y of January, 2002. 
•Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CINDY A. BUSCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAY BUSCH, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CLARIFY 
DECREE & PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
DEFER HER OBLIGATION TO PAY 
DEFENDANT'S EQUITY UNTIL HE HAS 
SATISFIED THE SECOND MORTGAGE 
Civil No. 984908136 
Judge Stirba 
Commissioner Evans 
The Defendant's Motion to Clarity Decree and Plaintiffs Motion to Defer her Obligation to 
Pay Defendant's Equity until he has satisfied the Second Mortgage came on for Hearing on Tuesday, 
April 24, 2001 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Michael S. Evans, Domestic 
Commissioner. The Plaintiff was present in Court and represented by her attorney, Steven C. 
Tycksen. The Defendant was present in Court and represented by'his attorney, Scott Mitchell. 
The parties made legal argument to the Court through counsel, whereupon the Commissioner 
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made a recommendation for an Order.. The Court having reviewed the recommendation, the file and 
legal memoranda, and for good cause therein appearing, does now hereby: 
ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE as follows: 
1. The Court Finds that the Bankruptcy Court exercised its concurrent jurisdiction in the 
Defendant's bankruptcy case and found that the Defendant's obligation to pay the second mortgage 
was a debt that was in the nature of support and was therefore non-dischargeable. 
2. In view of that ruling it is the opinion of this Court that the issue now sought to be brought 
before this Court in Defendant's Motion is, in fact, Res Judicata because of Judge Clark's ruling on 
the same issue. 
3. The Court therefore declines to rule further on the matter. 
4. The Defendant's Motion to Clarify the Decree is therefore denied. 
5. The Court finds that the Defendant's obligation to pay the second mortgage is a reasonable 
pre-condition to his right to receive his equity in the marital home and orders therefore that the 
Plaintiffs obligation to pay Defendant his equity in the marital home shall be deferred until he has 
satisfied the second mortgage in full. 
DATED this ay of April, 20(10. 
RECOMMENDED: 
vans, Domestic Commissioner \ orney for the Defendant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CINDY A. BUSCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAY BUSCH, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION 
TO COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATION 
Civil No. 984908136 
Judge Bruce Lubeck 
Commissioner Evans 
The Defendant's Objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation made 
by Commissioner Michael Evans during a Hearing held in this matter on April 
24, 2001 came on regularly for oral argument before the Honorable Bruce 
Lubeck, District Court Judge on August 14, 2001. The Plaintiff was represented 
by Steven C. Tycksen, but did not appear personally. The Defendant was 
present in Court and was represented by Scott Mitchell, Esq. The Court heard 
argument of counsel and having reviewed the memoranda and moving papers 
1 
1 and being otherwise fully advised in the premises does now hereby 
2 ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE as follows: 
3 1. The Defendant's Objection to the Commissioner's 
4 Recommendation is overruled. 
5 2. The Commissioner's Recommendation is sustained and 
6 upheld by the Court. 
7 DATED this of August, 2001 . 
